نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 گروه فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات، معارف اسلامی و ارشاد، دانشگاه امام صادق(ع)، تهران، ایران.
2 دانش آموخته سطح چهار فقه و اصول حوزه علمیه قم،قم، ایران.گروه فقه و مبانی حقوق اسلامی،دانشکده الهیات،دانشگاه امام صادق،تهران،ایران.
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The fundamental debate between the theory of Mintaqat al-Faragh (the Zone of Permissibility) and the theory of Absolute Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih) goes beyond a simple disagreement over the scope of the jurist’s authority. Rather, it reflects two distinct foundations concerning the relationship between Islamic law (Shari'ah), sovereignty, and Islamic civilization-building. Within Imam Khomeini’s jurisprudential framework, absolute guardianship is not merely an expansion of political authority; rather, it constitutes a primary ruling that takes precedence over the institutional hierarchy of rulings and enables their reorganization in accordance with the overriding public interest of preserving the Islamic system. By establishing the precedence of the evidence of public interest over the evidence for secondary particular rulings, this foundation permits the temporary suspension of certain religious obligations, the redefinition of legal subjects, and authoritative intervention in both the public and private spheres in cases of conflict between competing obligations. It also explains the permissibility of delegating certain governmental responsibilities to authorized institutions within the framework of centralized guardianship. By contrast, the theory of Mintaqat al-Faragh, developed by the late Martyr Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, rests on the dual concepts of Khilafat al-Nas (the vicegerency of the people) and Shahadat al-Anbiya (the testimony of the prophets), as well as the principle of non-prescriptive permissibility. By distinguishing the supreme supervisory authority of religious leadership from the legislative authority of the Muslim community, this theory restricts the ruler’s legislative jurisdiction exclusively to areas in which no primary obligation or prohibition has been established. It also requires the exercise of guardianship to remain directed toward the realization of the objectives of the Islamic school of thought.
Employing a comparative approach and a descriptive-analytical method, this article examines the theoretical foundations and structural implications of these two theories in the thought of Ayatollah Martyr Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the late Imam Khomeini. The findings indicate that the principal differences between these two schools lie in their respective mechanisms for generating binding obligations, exercising sovereignty, distributing governmental responsibilities, and regulating jurisprudential responses to emerging phenomena and complex conflicts of interest in governance. On the one hand, restricting legislation to the sphere of permissible acts under the Mintaqat al-Faragh model, although it safeguards the normative authority of religious texts, may lead to legal and institutional deadlock when confronting large-scale, systemic conflicts of interest. Absolute guardianship, however, should not be understood as a mechanism for departing from Islamic law, but rather as an internal jurisprudential framework for reproducing the effectiveness of the Shari'ah. Accordingly, the model developed by the late Imam Khomeini, owing to its capacity for overarching regulation and structural flexibility, offers a more comprehensive framework for addressing the requirements of complex governance and Islamic system-building.
کلیدواژهها [English]